Internet Martial Law in Name of National Security Emerging
The Storm Media Opinion, January 8, 2026
The most striking aspect of proposed amendments under the “10 National Security Laws” put forth by the administration of President Lai Ching-te is Article 4 of the National Security Act, which explicitly prohibits “publicly advocating, promoting, or supporting foreign countries, the Mainland, Hong Kong, Macau, or hostile overseas forces in waging war against our country or taking non-peaceful measures to eliminate our sovereignty.” Violators face fines of up to NT$1 million (about US$31,000)—commonly referred to as the “Unification Clause.”
Advocating unification by force is an unpopular position in Taiwan. According to Mainland Affairs Council polling released last year, only 1.2 percent of the public support rapid unification, let alone backing military unification. The government should be confident that such views could be easily countered in the marketplace of ideas or in elections. That the Lai administration now deliberately singles out this issue for legislation not only highlights its lack of confidence but also suggests ulterior motives.
First, Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) stated that the law does not allow individuals to threaten robbery or arson online, and it should not tolerate speech advocating foreign aggression or the elimination of Taiwan. There should be no double standard. Liang’s remarks intentionally confuse the issue. Existing provisions in the Criminal Code already regulate threatening others online: Article 151 criminalizes threats to the public, Article 305 addresses threats to public safety, and Article 103 and 104 on external danger crimes already cover anti-“Unification Clause” measures. Both the conditions for criminal liability and legal clarity are relatively clear. Why then does the Lai administration loudly push to amend the National Security Act—is it legal ignorance or ulterior intent?
Second, under the Criminal Code’s external danger provisions, enforcement against the “Unification Clause” requires investigation, prosecution, and judicial review, with the prerequisite being evidence of collusion. In contrast, the proposed Article 4 of the National Security Act criminalizes mere speech. Even more absurd, the determination of guilt would be made by administrative agencies—namely the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, MAC, and other agencies. In other words, it places the power to criminalize speech entirely in the hands of the executive. Criminalizing advocacy of unification by force solely through administrative discretion recalls the abuses of the martial law era. Yet under the Lai administration, post-martial law procedures requiring judicial review are completely bypassed, providing a prime opportunity for administrative overreach, political persecution, and violations of fundamental freedoms.
Third, the “Unification Clause” also aims to regulate the Internet. One of the four new provisions grants the MOI the authority to demand that platform operators remove content suspected of advocating unification by force, and even to order Internet Service Providers to block access. If implemented, then not only individual posts but entire fan pages or websites could be taken down, severely infringing on freedom of expression, with the only basis being the MOI’s discretion.
This intent to control the Internet is not unprecedented. Hidden behind the “10 National Security Laws,” the newly added Article 64-1 of the Social Order Maintenance Act mirrors the “Unification Clause,” stipulating that the MOI can remove online content that publicly advocates, spreads, or broadcasts hateful speech, terrorism, or statements by hostile foreign forces that could inflame social divisions or eliminate sovereignty and affect public order. Non-compliant providers may face fines or have their content blocked.
The Social Order Maintenance Act’s definitions are even vaguer than the National Security Act: what constitutes “hateful speech”? Criticizing the president’s old residence for illegal construction—does that count? Accusing opposition parties of being pro-China or “kowtowing to Beijing”—does that count? The key point: all determinations are made by the MOI. If the MOI becomes the arbiter of speech standards, questioning government policy or officials’ conduct could become taboo.
By now, many will recognize a familiar pattern. The so-called national security amendments are effectively a resurrection of the Digital Intermediary Services Act. During the tenure of President Tsai Ing-wen from 2016 to 2024, attempts to control the Internet through this Act sparked strong public backlash, forcing former President Tsai to pause the legislation. Yet President Lai now resurrects it under the guise of national security. The DPP, having gradually consolidated control over major domestic media over nearly a decade in power, still finds online discourse a thorn in its side. Where former President Tsai used the Social Order Maintenance Act to regulate Internet speech and create a chilling effect, the Lai administration has gone further, codifying provisions to control platforms and online content, ensuring that the executive branch alone can immediately remove and suppress dissenting opinions.